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📣 Guardian Agent: Guard AI-generated code
The software supply chain has become one of the most contested battlegrounds in security.
Modern applications are no longer made up of monolithic code. They’re assembled from thousands of moving parts, including open-source libraries, commercial components, and proprietary modules , all stitched together inside fast-moving pipelines.
When even one of those pieces is compromised, the ripple effect can be enormous. SolarWinds and Log4j proved just how quickly a single flaw can cascade into a global incident.
To bring order to this complexity, the industry turned to a familiar idea from manufacturing: the Bill of Materials (BOM). In factories, a BOM catalogs every part in a product. In software, it serves a similar purpose, but with higher stakes. It documents not only what goes into an application, but increasingly, how it was put together.
Two artifacts are at the center of this shift:
The comparison of PBOM vs SBOM signals more than a technical distinction. It reflects a new reality: transparency alone is no longer enough.
What organizations need now is integrity, traceability, and continuous validation. Working together, SBOM and PBOM establish a complete security Bill of Materials, one that doesn’t just describe software, but proves it can be trusted.
Although both are Bills of Materials, SBOMs and PBOMs serve very different purposes in the software supply chain. One captures what goes into an application. The other records how it was built. Together, they address two sides of the same challenge: transparency and integrity.
At its core, an SBOM is a static inventory. It lists every library, dependency, and module in an application, essential for identifying vulnerabilities, tracking licenses, and meeting compliance requirements. But it’s limited to a snapshot in time, offering no visibility into whether a vulnerability is exploitable or whether the build process itself was tampered with.
A PBOM, in contrast, is a dynamic, continuous record of the development pipeline. It captures commits, build configurations, security scans, and deployment data. This context transforms an SBOM from a simple component list into a verifiable artifact, backed by evidence of a secure build process.
Here’s a side-by-side comparison to highlight the distinction:
| Attribute | SBOM | PBOM |
| Core purpose | Transparency: what’s inside an application | Integrity and traceability: how the application was built |
| Scope | Product-focused (dependencies, licenses, components) | Process-focused (commits, build logs, runtime configs) |
| Data type | Static snapshot | Continuous event log |
| Primary use case | Vulnerability lookup, license compliance, reporting | Supply chain integrity, forensic analysis, contextual risk prioritization |
Related Content: What is a software bill of materials (SBOM)?
An SBOM answers “what’s inside,” while a PBOM answers “how it was made” with evidence you can trust.
That shift from a static list to a living record is what turns component transparency into operational security.
| Source control lineage: commit hashes, authors, code reviews, branch protection status, and the exact pull request that introduced a change. | Build environment details: CI job IDs, build scripts, compiler and dependency hashes, container base images, and signatures for intermediate artifacts. | Security controls telemetry: results from SAST, DAST, SCA, secrets scanners, IaC checks, and policy gates, including timestamps and pass/fail states. |
| Configuration and deployment context: Infrastructure as Code, service manifests, image digests, environment variables, and whether a service is internet-exposed, behind a WAF, or internal-only. | Ownership and approval trail: code owners, reviewers, exceptions granted, and risk acceptances tied to specific commits or builds. | Attestations and signatures: cryptographic proofs that a build ran in a trusted environment and that artifacts were not tampered with in transit. |
A new CVE drops for a JSON parser in your dependency graph.
Operationalizing a BOM requires two very different approaches. SBOM automation is about producing a document at a specific moment, while PBOM usage is about capturing evidence continuously.
Generating an SBOM is usually a discrete pipeline step. Tools such as Syft, Trivy, and CycloneDX generators scan source code, container images, or build artifacts to create a machine-readable inventory.
Teams often configure these tools as GitHub Actions, Jenkins jobs, or GitLab CI steps. With every build, a fresh SBOM is created, providing developers and auditors a transparent view of dependencies.
That automation is critical for compliance and vulnerability management. Each new release ships with a signed SBOM, making it possible to answer quickly when a new CVE is disclosed. This step ensures you always have an accurate, point-in-time inventory.
Related Content: A practical guide to SBOM
A PBOM works differently. It doesn’t run as a one-off scan. Instead, it integrates across the entire CI/CD pipeline, listening for commits, builds, scans, and deployments.
Every event is recorded and cryptographically signed, forming a ledger that tells not only what was built but how it was built.
This continuous evidence capture changes the nature of pipeline assurance. Instead of simply producing an artifact at the end, the PBOM acts as a passive observer, validating the process itself. That distinction matters: SBOM automation is active and imperative; PBOM collection is declarative and persistent.
In short, SBOM automation provides the snapshot, while PBOM usage provides the context. Both are required if organizations want their Bills of Materials to stand up to scrutiny.
While SBOMs benefit from established formats like SPDX and CycloneDX, the PBOM standard is still evolving.
There isn’t yet a universally recognized schema for capturing pipeline events, but the direction is becoming clear.
Commercial vendors have pioneered their own approaches to PBOM, showing the value of continuous evidence in securing the software supply chain.
At the same time, community-driven initiatives like pbom.dev have built frameworks like the Open Software Supply Chain Attack Reference (OSC&R), which catalogs tactics and techniques specific to pipeline attacks. These efforts give security teams a shared language for describing the risks PBOMs are designed to mitigate.
Rather than starting from scratch, the industry is looking to extend proven standards. CycloneDX, for example, introduced the Operations BOM (OBOM) format to describe runtime configurations, services, and dependencies beyond the build artifact itself.
OBOM’s mission aligns closely with PBOM: capturing a full-stack view of how software is created and deployed. By building on such extensible schemas, PBOM data could become interoperable with the broader SBOM ecosystem, including the tools already in wide use.
A formal PBOM standard would do more than simplify integration. It would enable organizations to build centralized inventories that unify SBOMs, PBOMs, and runtime context into a single source of truth. That level of visibility is critical for mature software supply chain risk management. It would also give regulators, customers, and auditors confidence by elevating PBOMs from vendor artifacts to verifiable industry records.
The strongest approach to supply chain security doesn’t pit SBOM and PBOM against each other. Instead, it combines their strengths into a unified strategy, where the SBOM acts as a compliance-ready artifact and the PBOM provides the evidence that the artifact can be trusted.
Every SBOM generated during the build should be backed by the PBOM ledger. Cryptographic signatures, commit hashes, and job IDs link the SBOM to the exact pipeline run that produced it.
This ensures consumers can verify that the SBOM reflects the true state of the artifact, not a tampered version.
Pairing component inventories with pipeline evidence turns static lists into actionable intelligence.
When an SBOM includes links to associated security scans, infrastructure configs, and runtime exposure, it evolves from a compliance document into a self-validating record of SBOM security.
Robust SBOM automation ensures every build produces a fresh inventory. At the same time, the PBOM continuously verifies that the generation process itself is secure.
This dual approach guarantees that SBOM tools are operating in a trusted environment and that the resulting outputs remain accurate.
PBOM data provides the inputs for accurate VEX statements, clarifying which vulnerabilities are exploitable in practice.
By attaching VEX to an SBOM, organizations can filter irrelevant alerts at scale, cutting through noise and focusing on real risks.
A single platform that unifies SBOM and PBOM data provides version control, historical records, and a consolidated view of the software supply chain. This approach makes it easier to respond to new disclosures, meet audit requirements, and track how risks evolve over time.
For teams looking to embed these practices into development workflows, Apiiro Develop offers guidance on integrating BOM management into CI/CD and beyond.
The evolution from SBOM to PBOM reflects a broader shift in how organizations approach software supply chain security.
SBOMs deliver the transparency regulators require, but their static nature limits what they can prove. PBOMs bring the missing context , the ledger of commits, builds, scans, and deployments that transforms lists of components into evidence of integrity.
The conversation shouldn’t be PBOM vs. SBOM, but how the two work together. SBOMs document what is inside an application, while PBOMs verify how it was made. When combined, they create a complete security BOM, one that both meets compliance requirements and provides continuous assurance against tampering and exploitable vulnerabilities.
Apiiro helps organizations get there faster by embedding dynamic visibility into the software architecture itself, from code to runtime. With deep analysis, contextual risk prioritization, and continuous validation, teams can integrate SBOMs and PBOMs seamlessly into their pipelines without slowing innovation.
Ready to strengthen your software supply chain? Book a demo to see how you can operationalize SBOM and PBOM together.
An SBOM lists every component, including those never used at runtime. A PBOM captures pipeline evidence, runtime configurations, and deployment context. This shows which vulnerable components are actually loaded, reachable, or exposed, allowing teams to prioritize remediation based on real-world risk instead of theoretical vulnerabilities.
Not today. Regulations like the U.S. Executive Order and EU Cyber Resilience Act specifically require an SBOM in formats such as SPDX or CycloneDX. A PBOM is best used to generate and validate those SBOMs, ensuring they are accurate, tamper-evident, and backed by pipeline evidence.
Key metrics include reduced Change Failure Rate, lower Mean Time to Recovery, and increased deployment frequency without a spike in security incidents. Each demonstrates that PBOM evidence is improving integrity checks, accelerating incident response, and enabling teams to release software faster while keeping risk under control.
Yes. While the formal PBOM standard is still emerging, efforts like CycloneDX OBOM offer a strong foundation. Vendors are building platforms that capture pipeline events automatically, while open communities like pbom.dev are developing frameworks to define common PBOM data models and threat scenarios.
Both serve unique purposes. SBOMs should be versioned and archived with each release as immutable compliance artifacts. PBOMs act as a continuous, living ledger of the pipeline, providing ongoing assurance. Maintaining both ensures organizations meet regulatory requirements and retain verifiable evidence of supply chain integrity.